The Logic Of Scientific Discovery Karl Popper 科学发现的逻辑

　　When first published in 1959, this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge. It remains one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the 20th century.
　　CONTENTS
% H, F  {- }( V　　Translators’ Note xii
　　Preface to the First Edition, 1934 xv
　　Preface to the First English Edition, 1959 xviiiPART I Introduction to the Logic of Science1 A Survey of Some Fundamental Problems 31 The Problem of Induction
2 g6 Z" _9 G0 r: j* m　　2 Elimination of Psychologism
　　3 Deductive Testing of Theories
　　4 The Problem of Demarcation
　　5 Experience as a Method
  d6 ^9 E! W* `: Y7 F$ K8 V　　6 Falsifiability as a Criterion of Demarcation7 The Problem of the ‘Empirical Basis’
% M5 q8 r8 w8 g5 |6 H7 T　　8 Scientific Objectivity and Subjective Conviction2 On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method 279 Why Methodological Decisions are Indispensable10 The Naturalistic Approach to the Theory of Method11 Methodological Rules as Conventions
　　PART II Some Structural Components of a Theory of Experience3 Theories 37
" t. R7 ~4 ^/ N2 A" d9 q$ J- @% d　　12 Causality, Explanation, and the Deduction of Predictions13 Strict and Numerical Universality
4 Y' a$ w! c3 h. c3 ^" ?" W　　14 Universal Concepts and Individual Concepts15 Strictly Universal and Existential Statements16 Theoretical Systems
　　17 Some Possibilities of Interpreting a System of Axioms18 Levels of Universality. The Modus Tollens4 Falsifiability 57
　　19 Some Conventionalist Objections
　　20 Methodological Rules
　　21 Logical Investigation of Falsifiability22 Falsifiability and Falsification
　　23 Occurrences and Events
　　24 Falsifiability and Consistency
1 _! g: M/ {* n9 ^# M0 u! o　　5 The Problem of the Empirical Basis 74
: e$ x6 h" b. x% V( c% H( g　　25 Perceptual Experiences as Empirical Basis:
　　Psychologism
/ z$ M9 \) E% L  a) ?　　26 Concerning the So-Called ‘Protocol Sentences’
　　27 The Objectivity of the Empirical Basis28 Basic Statements
7 g  K5 ~) _8 \. X4 x　　29 The Relativity of Basic Statements. Resolution ofFries’s Trilemma
　　30 Theory and Experiment
: o" w, u( V, p6 e! _　　6 Degrees of Testability 95
3 G. I% q3 P5 \3 h' ^; r　　31 A Programme and an Illustration
　　32 How are Classes of Potential Falsifiers to be Compared?
7 |; z5 |, f, c* `& ]) w4 U& d. p　　33 Degrees of Falsifiability Compared by Means of theSubclass Relation
9 e& Z6 o5 B  `( t  B: t! ~+ j　　34 The Structure of the Subclass Relation.
3 I( i' L% n5 b; q; F: L( |　　Logical Probability
( f- B/ J/ v" j6 K1 X( H9 C　　35 Empirical Content, Entailment, and Degreesof Falsifiability
+ M) p" ^" F1 j7 X. m　　36 Levels of Universality and Degrees of Precisionviii contents
　　37 Logical Ranges. Notes on the Theory of Measurement38 Degrees of Testability Compared by Referenceto Dimensions
! {" S9 [/ N2 g1 [　　39 The Dimension of a Set of Curves
　　40 Two Ways of Reducing the Number of Dimensionsof a Set of Curves
　　7 Simplicity 121
$ b: b4 @5 }  ]: S' C" J% m　　41 Elimination of the Aesthetic and the PragmaticConcepts of Simplicity
　　42 The Methodological Problem of Simplicity43 Simplicity and Degree of Falsifiability44 Geometrical Shape and Functional Form
　　45 The Simplicity of Euclidean Geometry
" w8 C" x  Y% c1 L! ]0 m2 h　　46 Conventionalism and the Concept of Simplicity8 Probability 133
1 S! A$ o8 i! U3 ?　　47 The Problem of Interpreting Probability Statements48 Subjective and Objective Interpretations49 The Fundamental Problem of the Theory of Chance50 The Frequency Theory of von Mises
0 N" i$ C, }7 @' D+ j% y4 E9 Y# n/ M! k　　51 Plan for a New Theory of Probability
) C, p8 _6 ~0 k) P- L6 K( m　　52 Relative Frequency within a Finite Class53 Selection, Independence, Insensitiveness, Irrelevance54 Finite Sequences. Ordinal Selection andNeighbourhood Selection
, m- X9 I/ F, M! t3 z. ?' Q$ V　　55 n-Freedom in Finite Sequences
! S2 Y, Q* H& K　　56 Sequences of Segments. The First Form of theBinomial Formula
$ k" X  ?- e. Y　　57 Infinite Sequences. Hypothetical Estimatesof Frequency
: R; j% C" R* b# _　　58 An Examination of the Axiom of Randomness59 Chance-Like Sequences. Objective Probability60 Bernoulli’s Problem
　　61 The Law of Great Numbers (Bernoulli’s Theorem)62 Bernoulli’s Theorem and the Interpretation ofProbability Statements
9 M/ s; `& E, C* e' S　　63 Bernoulli’s Theorem and the Problem of Convergencecontents ix
　　64 Elimination of the Axiom of Convergence. Solutionof the ‘Fundamental Problem of the Theory of Chance’
　　65 The Problem of Decidability
　　66 The Logical Form of Probability Statements67 A Probabilistic System of Speculative Metaphysics68 Probability in Physics
2 j0 u" i5 p! Q' {7 Z; F. g　　69 Law and Chance
　　70 The Deducibility of Macro Laws from Micro Laws71 Formally Singular Probability Statements72 The Theory of Range
9 i" g; t, c# k. _　　9 Some Observations on Quantum Theory 20973 Heisenberg’s Programme and the
　　Uncertainty Relations
　　74 A Brief Outline of the Statistical Interpretation ofQuantum Theory
' e* C: `8 i8 K+ f+ G$ T4 x　　75 A Statistical Re-Interpretation of theUncertainty Formulae
/ |3 b5 s& P# `% {/ L/ ]　　76 An Attempt to Eliminate Metaphysical Elements byInverting Heisenberg’s Programme; with Applications77 Decisive Experiments
- I5 Q) \( F. V　　78 Indeterminist Metaphysics
! _5 \, X- T4 a　　10 Corroboration, or How a Theory Stands up to Tests 24879 Concerning the So-Called Verification of Hypotheses80 The Probability of a Hypothesis and the Probabilityof Events: Criticism of Probability Logic81 Inductive Logic and Probability Logic
# e& y% ^4 x+ `, v! Z　　82 The Positive Theory of Corroboration: How aHypothesis may ‘Prove its Mettle’
　　83 Corroborability, Testability, and Logical Probability84 Remarks Concerning the Use of the Concepts ‘True’
# Y) y9 N/ Z2 x% b　　and ‘Corroborated’
) s3 Z/ D8 i( O  K- P6 ?9 g　　85 The Path of Science
7 S0 t: J; F1 @* i" [5 f　　APPENDICES
: s) ]% I$ a. i4 m8 D1 W　　i Definition of the Dimension of a Theory 283ii The General Calculus of Frequency in Finite Classes 286x contents
　　iii Derivation of the First Form of the BinomialFormula 290
' l+ ^  h: C: m0 V' P( J1 o　　iv A Method of Constructing Models of RandomSequences 293
$ h3 E) j: q4 i% I. n　　v Examination of an Objection. The Two-SlitExperiment 297
　　vi Concerning a Non-Predictive Procedure ofMeasuring 301
+ ?4 U2 j+ O  r- Y3 v5 y　　vii Remarks Concerning an Imaginary Experiment 305NEW APPENDICES
/ f2 D2 [7 }# v3 ]# ?/ {　　*i Two Notes on Induction and Demarcation,1933–1934 312
/ G- h) U) y  V1 O0 w9 [" t　　*ii A Note on Probability, 1938 319
6 V4 M" t. k, W$ G) Y6 }. A　　*iii On the Heuristic Use of the Classical Definitionof Probability 325
4 J. [' C' i! C- p& ~9 N* m* x　　*iv The Formal Theory of Probability 329
　　*v Derivations in the Formal Theory of Probability 356*vi On Objective Disorder or Randomness 369*vii Zero Probability and the Fine-Structure ofProbability and of Content 374
* J6 X7 p- M. m" ?5 W& T" m　　*viii Content, Simplicity, and Dimension 392*ix Corroboration, the Weight of Evidence, andStatistical Tests 402
% t# K" n1 E- ~, J5 P0 G　　*x Universals, Dispositions, and Natural orPhysical Necessity 440
/ E6 C; X3 X. S. y' `　　*xi On the Use and Misuse of Imaginary
　　Experiments, Especially in Quantum Theory 464*xii The Experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.
* [4 k' Z3 K; {( R　　A Letter from Albert Einstein, 1935 481
+ z+ }. t  b: U& v- T1 {* R　　INDICES, compiled by Dr. J. Agassi
1 M' I) p0 L2 d- y- t& u　　Name Index 489
　　Subject Index 494

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